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THE EMERGENCE OF METROPOLITAN AREAS AS A NEW FORM
OF INTERFEDERATIVE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF AIX-MARSEILLE-PROVENCE AND THE
METROPOLITAN REGION OF RIO DE JANEIRO
Arícia Fernandes Correia*
Rômulo S. R. Sampaio**

ABSTRACT
The exponential demographic increase of the last century and the transformation
of the cities, from industrial to service providers, added to the phenomenon of
conurbation. In addition, the new social, environmental, economic, political and
cultural dynamics of close cities, challenged the traditional municipal power
and required a collaborative new management framework. Global cities became
metropolitan areas. Issues of local urban interest are now of regional
preoccupation. Governmental institutional frameworks and urban planning
were not designed to match this new socioeconomic and environmental
metropolitan order. This paper deals with the legal challenges of creating
metropolitan governance structures comparing France and Brazil. This is a
useful comparison in the sense that the demand for metropolitan governance
structure is shared by different countries despite the differences in the way their
systems of government are structured. France is a unitary State, and Brazil is
structured into a federal system. This manuscript aims at demonstrating that not
only communes, in the case of France, but also municipalities, in the case of
Brazil, need regional solidarity strategies and federative cohesion to overcome
common problems in large metropolitan areas such as transportation, sewage
collection and treatment facilities, housing, sustainable drainage policies and
even public safety policies. As case studies for the comparison proposed in this
paper, we examine the metropolitan areas of Aix-Marseille-Provence, in France,
with that of Rio de Janeiro, in Brazil.
KEY WORDS: Urban Planning, Metropolitan areas, Conurbation, Regional
Urban Development
1.

INTRODUCTION

In 2050, 89% of the Latin America population will be living in cities. 1
The shift from a rural to an urban society is also expected in Europe. Mainstream
* Professor Correia is an attorney with the Rio de Janeiro General Attorney’s Office. She holds
Post-Doctorate degree from University of Paris, Panthéon Sorbonne and a Doctorate and Master
degrees in Public Law by the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). She is currently a
professor of law at UERJ.
** Professor Sampaio is a founding Partner of Rennó, Penteado, Reis & Sampaio LL.P with
offices in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He holds Doctorate (S.J.D.) and Master (LL.M.)
degrees in Environmental Law from Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University in New
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urban issues, like transportation, sewage treatment and waste management will
no longer be subject only to local authorities. Rather, they will have to adapt to
the phenomenon of conurbation, defined as an urban area containing a large
number of dwellers and “…formed by various towns growing and joining
together.” 2 For large urban areas all over the world, conurbation is already
happening. Furthermore, functional metropolis can also derive from a group of
several cities with the same dynamics – social, cultural, economical –, despite
being already geographically “conurbated.” Dealing with the new governance
structural demand arising thereof constitutes the big urban planning and
management challenge facing law and policymakers around the globe towards
the implementation of all urban dwellers’ right to the city. 3
The rapid rate of urban growth around the world is leading to
conurbation and the appearance of what we can call “functional metropolis.”
Those global cities, which, for Saskia Sassen, 4 developed in the era of economic
and political globalization, are becoming the heart of metropolitan areas. When
cities get so close together due to a natural sprawling caused by urban growth
or by economical, political and social conditions that turn them into functional
metropolis, many of the issues subject to local authorities become of a
metropolitan concern. A transportation policy choice of one municipality within
a metropolitan area might have a negative impact on the neighboring city. The
housing policy of a local power may be not enough to consider the ones that
live far away from the city, in the suburb areas. And that is the case for other
sensitive and equally important areas such as waste management, sewage
collection and treatment facilities, sustainable drainage policies and even public
safety policies including the hosting of jail buildings. In light of all those
intertwined urban issues, a demand for a new form of governance arises
naturally, regardless of how the government is structured in any given country.
The case studies examined herein are examples of two distinct forms of
government (Brazil, a federal republic, and France, characterized by a
centralized federal authority) experiencing the conurbation and functional

York and a Master of Laws in Economic and Social Law and LL.B. from Pontific Catholic
University of Paraná Law School (PUC-PR). He is currently a professor of law at Getulio
Vargas Foundation (FGV) School of Law in Rio de Janeiro. He is also a visiting professor at
Georgia State University School of Law in Atlanta and an adjunct professor at Elisabeth School
of Law at Pace University in New York.
1
UN-HABITAT. Estado de las Ciudades de America Latina y el Caribe 2012.
http://www.onuhabitat.org Acesso em 7.11.2013.
2
Cambridge Dictionary, available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/englishportuguese/conurbation, last visited 23 January 2018.
3
The acclaimed expression is form Henry Lefebvre, in his classic: LEFEBVRE, Henry. The
right of the city. On the other hand, the one who was more concerned about inequality in city
is David Harvey in his oeuvres in general and, for this topic, more specifically in his book
“Social Justice and the City”.
4
SASSEN, Saskia. The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo: Princeton University Press,
1991.
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metropolisation phenomenon and the new governance framework demand
arising thereof.
Based on the experience drawn from a week-long immersion into the
Aix-Marseille Provence metropolitan area, filled with lectures from renowned
scholars and practitioners and instructive fieldtrips, all as part of the 2017 Study
Space program of Georgia State University 5, we gathered enough information
to propose some preliminary grounds for a comparative analysis presented in
this manuscript. Our objective is twofold: first, to shed light on the challenges
of metropolitan governance arising from two different countries facing the
conurbation phenomenon and the metropolitan issues; second, to evaluate
possible legal and institutional tools to address those challenges. This paper
takes the knowledge acquired during that week-long program in the AixMarseille Provence metropolitan area and compares it with the Rio de Janeiro
metropolitan area.
The study of both metropolitan areas allowed us to identify governance
challenges in promoting regional cooperation among local powers and
interfederative regional power governance structures alien to those traditional
systems of government. Possible legal and institutional solutions include: a
legal system with mandatory collaborative provision imposed upon
municipalities, a political and outreach strategy aimed at creating a voluntary
spirit of collaboration among local powers, and an administrative structure of
governance allowing for ample public participation. Some of those solutions
have already been put into practice by both metropolitan regions examined in
this manuscript.
In order to identify the challenges and explore legal and institutional
solutions to the metropolitan areas of Aix-Marseille Provence and Rio de
Janeiro we begin with a brief overview of how the French and Brazilian
governments are structured. Understanding the different forms of government
will be illustrative to demonstrate that the governance challenges are common
in metropolitan areas, irrespectively of the nation state organization power
structure they are subsumed to. The second topic of our manuscript examines
both countries’ constitutional provisions regarding urban law. The share of
power a municipality holds within each constitutional system is instrumental in
identifying metropolitan governance challenges and, consequently, the legal
and institutional tools to overcome them. We then turn to the analysis of both
countries’ federal laws regarding metropolitan areas. Both systems opted for
federal laws laying the grounds for a regional and cooperative form of
governance without undermining the foundations upon which both governments
are structured. The creation of legally existent metropolitan areas in Brazil and
France are dependent upon regional or local initiatives, a sort of bottom-up
5

Study Space X Marseille took place in the french city from 19 to 23 June of 2017, organized
by Georgia State University College of Law’s Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan
Growth and coordinated by Professor Julian Juergensmeyer and Karen Johnston.
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democratic approach. In Brazil, the federal law – the Metropolitan Statute from
2015 – deals only with metropolis. In France, metropolis is part of a General
Code, created by two specific metropolitan rules: the MAPAM law, known as
“modernization of the public action and affirmation of the metropolises”,
promulgated in 2014, and the NOTRe law (new territorial organization of the
Republic) published in 2015. Whether those laws constitute a sufficient legal
instrument to promote a new regional metropolitan form of governance is the
subject of the analysis conducted in this manuscript. Finally, before we render
our concluding remarks, we intend to draw examples from the challenges, as
well as from the legal and institutional tools we were able to identify in the AixMarseille Provence metropolitan area and compare them to those of the
Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro.
2. FORMS OF STATE IN BRAZIL AND IN FRANCE
The political and administrative structures of France and Brazil are
different. 6 France is organized into a unitary, centralized state. Brazil is a
peculiar federation with three autonomous entities sharing legislative and
administrative powers: the federal government, states and municipalities. 7 The
federal district where the capital, Brasília, is located, is also an autonomous and
independent entity of the federation.
In practice, this apparent significant difference is relativized ever since
a decentralized administrative movement began in France with the reform of the
1958 Constitution in 2003. Conversely in Brazil, the federation concentrates
much of the administrative power in the federal government, despite the
constitutional provisions of shared powers. Furthermore, the largest share of
Brazilian taxes is collected and held by the federal government, which generates
a fiscal imbalance impairing states and municipalities, mainly, in their abilities
to exercise their share of the constitutional administrative power in areas such
as urban law.. This fiscal imbalance makes states and municipalities heavily

6

The comparison between both systems of government is presented in greater detail by
CORREIA, Arícia Fernandes. FARIAS, Talden. e AIETA, Vânia. Planejamento urbano e
energias renováveis: diálogos franco-brasileiros. Belo Horizonte: Editar, 2016 – tradução livre.
7
Although not provoking a quarrel like the historical one between federalists (HAMILTON,
Alexander. MADISON, James. JAY, John. The Federalist Papers: A Collection of Essays
Written in Favor of the New Constitution) and non-federalists, the inclusion of the
Municipalities as a federative entity in the Brazilian constitution was a victory from the
municipalism movement, guaranteeing political, administrative and, in these, financial
autonomy to the local powers: the municipalities. It proved earlier than its promulgation:
MEIRELLES, Hely Lopes. 3ª ed. ref. e atual. Direito Municipal Brasileiro. São Paulo: Revista
dos Tribunais, 1977.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol2/iss1/4

47

Correia and Sampaio: The Emergence of Metropolitan Areas as a New Form of Interfederat

dependent upon federal programs and from the transfer of resources from the
federal government.
On administrative urban management issues, however, municipalities in
Brazil and communes in France, enjoy a great deal of autonomy in the planning
and design of municipal policies. Such local autonomy is often a challenge for
collaborative regional power management structures. Municipalities are
reluctant to cede part of their autonomous power granted by their respective
systems of government to an alien structure of governance involving diverse
cities, often of different economic stature, social problems and, more
importantly, governed by rival political parties.
The differences in how the governments of Brazil and France are
structured, the degree of local power, and the challenges arising thereof can be
better contextualized in light of both countries´ constitutional frameworks. The
following two sections examine the Brazilian and the French constitutions
regarding their systems of government. The focus is on highlighting the degree
of local power and the challenges for a new form of collaborative regional
power structure to deal with the issues of common metropolitan interest.
2.1.

Brazilian Constitutional Framework

Brazil is organized into a peculiar form of federation, with three degrees
of powers: federal, represented by the Union; regional, by the State-Members;
and local, through municipalities. The 1988 Federal Constitution (“BC/88”)
enumerates issues of exclusive federal legislative authority and issues of shared
ones. The BC/88 conferred municipalities with an autonomous and independent
status within the federation, equivalent to federal and state governments, and
empowered them to enact laws and manage issues of local interest, mainly with
respect to urban planning.
The large list of enumerated shared powers to state and municipal
governments, including in the areas of environmental and urban policy,
indicates a great degree of autonomy. However, due to an intense federal
legislative appetite over all those issues of shared power, in practice, state and
municipal legislative powers end up being limited in scope. This is due to a
supremacy clause providing that federal law preempts state and municipal laws
over issues of shared legislative power. Therefore, state and municipal laws
often mirror those enacted by the federal congress or are laws detailing further
issues legislated already by the federal government. However, municipal
legislative power over issues of local interest such as those relating to land use
planning and the social function of the city provide municipalities with a great
degree of rulemaking autonomy.
Federal law dealing with cities is limited to setting forth general
provisions and tools municipalities can choose to include in their legislation,
zoning and planning regulation. The BC/88 dedicated a whole chapter (articles
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182 and 183) to deal with aspirational provisions such as the social function of
the city and urban property. Congress then enacted two relevant urban statutes
to further detail the constitutional aspirational provisions: the Statute of the City
(Law 10,257/2001) and the Statute of Metropolitan Areas (Law 13,089/2015).
Even though the federal government has occupied the field, preemption
randomly occurs in urban law because those federal constitutional and
legislative provisions work more as a charter of fundamental urban principles
and as a menu of different legal urban management tools for local lawmakers.
Though significant room for local legislative power remains. 8 A great deal of
political will remain within municipal authorities to preserve legislative and
management powers over issues of local interest.
The limiting factor of municipal power in Brazil is the uneven
distribution of wealth and of tax revenues. Most of the 5,570 municipalities in
Brazil are not independently economically viable, but instead rely upon the
distribution of federal and state tax revenues. In large municipalities with large
tax incomes, the municipal budget is often not sufficient to address the
challenges of related to deep social inequalities in large metropolitan areas.
Therefore, in practice, a high degree of dependence on federal and state funds
limits municipalities´ management powers arising from their legislative
constitutional authority. In this sense, grouping municipalities into a
collaborative metropolitan governance structure has the potential to strengthen
municipal leverage towards a larger financial independence that, in turn, will
enhance their legislative and self-management autonomy.
2.2.

FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Contrary to Brazil, a country organized into a federation, France is a
unitary state, an inheritance from absolutist times. More recently though, with
the 2003 reform of the 1958 Constitution, a new interpretation emerged. A
principle of administrative decentralization arose and resulted in an increase of
administrative and financial powers to the land collectivities that compose the
State. The unitary system of the French state had to accommodate a
constitutional principle reflecting a social demand for a decentralized
management structure.
France´s political administrative structure is composed of three levels of
elected local governmental authorities according to the General Code of Land

8

Some important urban legal instruments are mandatory, like a master plan for any city with
more than twenty thousand inhabitants. Others, however, such as participatory budgeting, fall
within the discretionary power of local authorities.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol2/iss1/4

49

Correia and Sampaio: The Emergence of Metropolitan Areas as a New Form of Interfederat

Collectivities: 9 10 regions, departments and communes. None of those more
than 35,000 entities within the country, however, have rulemaking power, at
least not to prevail over federal regulation. Chrétien and Chifflot explain that
« au sein des institutions françaises, la décentralisation correspond à
l´attribution d´une certaine autonomie à des collectivités qui ´s´administrent
librement par des conseils élus´, sous le contrôle du gouvernement. » 11
A commune is the equivalent of a municipality, representing the closest
local authority to the people of all those decentralized authorities. The country
has a long history of cooperation among communes with shared interests.12
Through an intercommunality structure that dates to the 19th Century, a
communality (group of communes) can collaborate in areas such as public
transportation, water supply and others alike. One kind of interfederative
collectivity is the metropolis, constituting the most integrated form of
intercommunality structure in France and providing for a regional authority to
deal with the common interests of a metropolitan area.
In urban law, for instance, the French Constitution set forth the
fundamental principle of local power over local territorial planning and
management. However, contrary to the Brazilian Constitution, the French
Magna Carta does not deal with urban law expressly. Constitutional urban
provisions in the French system are implicit, as ruled by the French State
Council, being part of the constitutional environmental protection provisions13
and other principles such as legitimate restrictions to the private property right.
When combined with the land collectivities self-management power, those
constitutional provisions provide for the legal framework on urban law. In that
sense, the notion of regional governance through the establishment of a
metropolis serves to strengthen communes by promoting economy of scale and
enhancing political power whenever feasible.
Against both countries´ constitutional background on urban law, the
following chapter examines the details of how local authority is exercised
through the legal framework in place. Brazil and France have enacted
metropolitan statutory provisions to accommodate an alien form of regional
9

Access
to
the
General
Code
of
Land
Collectivities:
< https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070633>
10
The most important bibliographic reference about land collectivities in France is: AUBY,
Jean-Bernard et alli. Droit des collectivités locales. 5a. ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1990.
11
Into French institutions, the decentralization means a kind of autonomy to collectivities so
that they can administrate themselves with freedom by elected organisms, under the
governmental control. (CHRÉTIEN, Patrice. et CHIFFLOT, Nicolas. Droit administratif. 13a
ed. Paris : Dalloz, 2012 – free translation).
12
CORREIA, Arícia Fernandes. FARIAS, Talden. e AIETA, Vânia. Planejamento urbano e
energias renováveis: diálogos franco-brasileiros. Belo Horizonte: Editar, 2016 – tradução livre.
13
The protection of Environmental Law happend by the promulgation of the “Bill of the
Environment”, from 2004, included in the french block of constitutionality.
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collaborative structure in their respective systems of government. The promises
of such an institutional arrangement are matched by the challenges of bringing
local authorities to the table and convincing them to cede part of their municipal
power on behalf of the regional common good.
3.

FRENCH AND BRAZILIAN LAWS ON METROPOLITAN AREAS

A legal framework to deal with metropolitan areas arose from a demand
for coordinated local polices due to the massive conurbation phenomenon
experienced by major cities around the world and by common economic,
political and social dynamics of metropolitan areas around those large
municipalities. Irrespectively of the political-administrative structure of any
given country, whether a unitary centralized state – like France, or a federalist
state such as Brazil –, the urban sprawl of recent decades created a need for
coordinated policies to provide city dwellers with access to services like water
supply and sewage, transportation, affordable housing, waste management and
others. That, in turn, imposed upon lawmakers the task of providing
metropolitan areas with a formal management structure with self-organization
and executive powers over those issues of common regional interest. Within
this collaborative management power structure, allowing for effective public
participation and balancing the distribution of deliberative power among
participating municipalities became a crucial part to achieving the metropolitan
goals of coordinating policies over issues of common regional interest. Both
countries accommodated the metropolitan demands into their respective legal
orders: in France, in the General Code of Land Collectivities; in Brazil, in the
Metropolitan Area Act of 2015. The following sections examine in greater detail
those metropolitan statutory frameworks.
3.1. THE FRENCH METROPOLIS AS AN INTERFEDERATIVE MANAGEMENT
STRUCTURE
Throughout the 20th Century, France experienced a growing demand
from decentralized authorities for a greater degree of administrative autonomy.
The central government responded by augmenting local authorities´ taxation
and legal powers. In January 2015, a French decree legally instituted into
metropolis all existing informal interfederative collaborative structures,
empowering them with self-taxation autonomy. All management powers
previously acquired by those more informal collaborative interfederative
structures were transferred to the then recently instituted metropolises by the
decree.
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According to the General Code of Land Collectivities 14, there are three
forms of governmental authorities: regions, departments and communes.
Considering France has over 35,000 communes, the governmental system had
to accommodate intercommunal collaboration to deal with issues of regional
common interest. Within this collaborative management structure emerged the
notion of a metropolis upon which the legal framework was built. According to
Article L-5217-1 in Chapter VII (Metropolis) of Book 2 (Cooperation
Interfederative) of the Fifth Section (Local Cooperation) of the General Code
of Land Collectivities, 15 a “metropolis” is defined as:
“…[a] public institution of inter-municipal co-operation
with self-taxation power which unites several communes
into one structure and without enclave within a space of
solidarity to elaborate and to lead together a project of
economic, ecological, educational, cultural and social
planning and development of their territory in order to
improve their cohesion and competitiveness and to
contribute to sustainable and inclusive development of the
regional territory.” 16
The creation and implementation of a metropolis is legally done by a
decree. The creating decree sets forth the name of the metropolis, its perimeter,
headquarters, enumerated powers as well as its starting operating date. A
metropolis is not bound by a specific term. Whenever a metropolis is instituted,
no time limitation applies.
Article L5217-2 of the General Code of Land Collectivities lists areas
of metropolitan authority. Zoning, actions towards the economic development
of the metropolis and management power over issues of metropolitan common
interest fall within the metropolis´ authority. The urban planning of a
metropolitan area is conducted “en lieu et place des communes membres” or, in
substitution of its commune’s members.
The French metropolitan legal framework empowered the metropolis
significantly. It also recognized an informal collaborative action practiced by
communes before a formal legal framework was in place. This legal recognition
14

Acess to the General Code of Land Colectivities:
< https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070633>, in 23
February 2018.
15
The Law MAPAM is considered the one of the modernisation of public action and
metropolitan affirmative act and was published in 27 January 2014. The Law n° 2015-991, from
August 7, 2015 brought a new land organization of the French Republic.
16
La métropole est un établissement public de coopération intercommunale à fiscalité propre
regroupant plusieurs communes d'un seul tenant et sans enclave au sein d'un espace de
solidarité pour élaborer et conduire ensemble un projet d'aménagement et de développement
économique, écologique, éducatif, culturel et social de leur territoire afin d'en améliorer la
cohésion et la compétitivité et de concourir à un développement durable et solidaire du
territoire régional. (free translation in english in the text)
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of a metropolis responded to the aforementioned historical demand without
changing the French system of government. The decentralized metropolis did
not constitute another layer of power-structure entity within the French unitary
state. Rather, it absorbed most of the local authorities’ powers over issues of
common regional interest. In practice, the legal recognition of a metropolitan
authority represented a subrogation of local entities´ authority in favor of
regional common interests. In that sense, the French metropolitan structures
end up being more robust than their Brazilian counterparts still limited by the
broad constitutional legislative and executive powers enjoyed by municipalities.
3.2.

THE BRAZILIAN METROPOLITAN LAW

The conception of metropolitan areas was allowed by the 1967 Brazilian
Constitution under the Chapter of “Social and Economic Order.” Under that
former constitutional order, the federal government was empowered to create
metropolitan areas by means of “complementary” law, one which requires
qualified majority in Congress. The current 1988 Constitution maintained a
similar provision, but empowered states – through their respective legislative
powers – to enact, also through qualified majority, laws creating metropolitan
areas. Article 25, paragraph 3, of the Brazilian Constitution allows for states to
create by state complementary law subject to a qualified majority, metropolitan
areas formed by neighboring cities. The identifiable need for integrated
management, planning and execution of common interest policies shall give rise
to the creation of a metropolitan area.
Another significant difference between the 1967 and the current 1988
Brazilian Constitution was that the metropolitan area provision was relocated in
the former Carta Magna to the Chapter dealing with the Organization of the
State. That, however, was not sufficient to confer upon metropolitan areas the
political status enjoyed by the federal, state, municipal and the federal district
governments. Metropolitan organizations were entitled to administrative
powers enumerated by state law and subject to municipal political autonomy. In
that way, metropolitan areas constitute a regional intergovernmental structure
of administrative power over areas of common interest. The 1988 Constitution
enabled states to institute and organize the administrative structure of a
metropolitan area.
The rationale behind the conception of metropolitan administrative
structures in Brazil lies in the recognition that some issues are not exclusively
of local interest whenever conurbation occurs. Issues like environmental
protection of local resources, water supply and sewage treatment, drainage,
transportation and waste management in metropolitan areas can be of regional
interest without, however, being of state interest to attract state legislative and
management power. Instead, whenever conurbation and functional metropolis
gives rise to shared interests, municipalities and the state will have joint
responsibilities demanding thereof an interfederative governance structure. That
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means a metropolitan management structure allowing for executive and
rulemaking powers to the municipalities and the state, instituted and organized
by the latter, but with enumerated powers exercised in conjunction with the
former.
The Brazilian Constitution did not empower metropolitan areas as an
independent and autonomous political entity within the federation. They rely,
therefore, on the cooperation among the executive powers of the municipalities
involved in the limits of the law of the state. Because those municipalities and
the state are autonomous political entities of the federation, there lies the
challenge of establishing an executive and legislative condominium over those
issues of common interest. In part, also because a metropolitan region created
by state law does not constitute an association of municipalities, but an organism
that takes care of common interests. A metropolis, therefore, does not substitute
local authority: the new and common interests must be taken into account
without undermining a municipality’s autonomy. The cities of a metropolitan
area cannot withdraw from this administrative management structure. In light
of their political autonomy, municipalities can vote as they please on those
issues of metropolitan interests and withhold the remaining powers over issues
of strictly local interest. But they will still be bound by the interventions arising
from the decisions made by the metropolitan authority on behalf of the regional
common interest. This special feature differentiates metropolitan governance
structures in Brazil from those in France. In the latter, the metropolis authority
claims the powers of the communes. In Brazil, the metropolitan authority
exercises a combination of powers conferred upon it by the state and
participating municipalities. Those powers must be duly justifiable in the
instituting statute as those needed for the management of issues of regional
common interest. 17
In Brazil, a state must initiate the process of instituting a metropolitan
authority whenever the need for more coordinated management in large urban
areas composed of two or more cities is identified. In that sense, the Brazilian
metropolitan authorities does not resemble those entities created by
international agreements setting regional governance structures among nationstates. Those authorities are instituted based on a voluntary sovereign will of
participating countries as opposed to the metropolitan regions in Brazil, which
result from the will of the state legislative power. That does not mean, however,
that states enjoy unlimited discretionary power to create metropolitan areas.
They must identify the demand for an interfederative governance structure
arising from the need of coordinated policies in issues of common interest. An
arbitrary state law creating a metropolitan area, one that does not account for an
17

This is the rationale of the Brazilian Supreme Court ruling in the paradigm case Adin n.
1842/RJ – STF, available at
http://stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarJurisprudencia.asp?s1=%28ADI%24%2ESCLA%2
E+E+1842%2ENUME%2E%29+OU+%28ADI%2EACMS%2E+ADJ2+1842%2EACMS%2
E%29&base=baseAcordaos&url=http://tinyurl.com/cbldmcg (last visited on 10 March 2018).
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integrated and coordinated management demand in light of issues of common
interest, is likely to be unconstitutional.
The Brazilian Metropolitan Act, Law 13,089 enacted on 12 January
2015, regulates a longstanding constitutional provision recognizing this new
form of intergovernmental (or interfederative) governance demand and creating
the standards that authorize the creation, by the state law, of metropolitan areas,
its common interests, the parameters of the governance system and deliberating
structure. Being part of a metropolitan region does not limit municipal politicaladministrative and legislative autonomy under the Brazilian Constitution. That
would also be unconstitutional. Rather, a metropolitan authority constitutes a
legal response to the conurbation phenomenon and to the functional
metropolitan standards, conditioning municipal authority to take into
consideration the regional common interest in areas of such nature. That is
exactly what the Metropolitan Law of 2015 addressed. The statute imposed the
requirement that local planning and management be consistent with regional
planning and management in areas of local interest identified by the
metropolitan authority.
The 2015 Metropolitan Law set forth the definition of a metropolis, a
metropolitan area, public service in areas of common interest and, most
importantly, interfederative governance. By the latter, the law defines the
sharing of responsibilities and actions among independent entities of the
federation regarding the organization, planning and execution of public services
in areas of common interest. The fundamental pillars for the interfederative
governance are those listed by article 6 of the law: prevailing of common over
local interests; shared responsibilities towards the promotion of integrated urban
development; political autonomy of the entities of the federation; due attention
for regional and local peculiarities; democratic management of the city;
effective use of public resources; and sustainable development.
Worth noticing that the interfederative governance structure created by
the 2015 Metropolitan Law aimed at highlighting the demand for a regional
management organization to deal with issues of common interest without
undermining the political autonomy of municipalities and states as set forth the
in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. To accommodate the country´s federalist
system of government with this new interfederative governance structure, the
2015 Metropolitan Law granted participating municipalities into a metropolitan
region the right to participate fully into the executive decision and rulemaking
process, as well as the obligation to share the financial burdens arising thereof
according to their respective shares as agreed upon in the articles of
incorporation. To that extent, article 8 of the 2015 Metropolitan Law instituted
an executive entity, a deliberative council and a technical and advisory body.
The executive entity shall be composed of representatives of the participating
entities of the federation (cities and state) to reflect and accommodate the
municipal political autonomy under the federalist system.
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One of the main features of the aforementioned 2015 Act is the
requirement imposed upon the Metropolitan Region to have an integrated urban
development plan, taking into consideration the local peculiarities of all
involved cities. Furthermore, the 2015 Act imposes upon participating
municipalities the need to review their respective master plans to make them
compatible with the integrated urban development plan. This is a major
provision as it weighs in favor of the regional common interest principle in
comparison with the constitutional local autonomy premise. In that regard, the
2015 Act came to reflect the ruling in a 1998 paradigm Supreme Court case
upholding that the Metropolitan Authority is an executive-administrative entity
combining all metropolitan interests, according to rules of proceedings that can
be freely agreed upon so long as one federalist entity´s will does not prevail
over the others. With respect specifically to the common interest principle, this
landmark precedent upheld the municipal autonomy, but ruled that such
important constitutional provision is not sufficient to allow a municipality to
refuse or withdraw from the metropolitan authority once instituted by state law.
The interfederative governance concept formally instated by the 2015
Metropolitan Law was able to legally accommodate a different institutional
framework demanded by the conurbation phenomenon and the new land
demands of common interests. Without undermining the federalist premise of
the Brazilian system of government, the interfederative governance concept
allowed for municipalities to participate fully in the executive and
administrative rulemaking process together with the state on matters of common
interest of a metropolitan area without undermining their autonomy over those
issues of local affairs strictly considered. In that sense, the 2015 Metropolitan
Law clears the pathway for metropolitan authorities to implement coordinated
and integrated common interest policies by providing the necessary legal
predictability and stability to address the shared urban, environmental and
socioeconomic demands arising from the conurbation phenomenon.
4.
THE
AIX-MARSEILLE-PROVENCE
METROPOLIS
METROPOLITAN REGION OF RIO DE JANEIRO

AND

THE

Against the brief historical and legal panorama presented hitherto, in
following sections we examine the Aix-Marseille-Provence Metropolis and the
Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro in a comparative perspective. We aim to
use both regions as case studies to support our analysis of France and Brazil,
indicating the need for an interfederative form of governance structure to face
the growing demand for integrated regional policymaking processes.

Published by Reading Room, 2017

56

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 2 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4

4.1.

THE AIX-MARSEILLE-PROVENCE METROPOLIS

The metropolis of Aix-Marseille Provence, the largest one in France,
concentrates 92 communes and 1.8 million inhabitants, 93% of the population
of Bouches-du-Rhône and 37% of the population of the ensemble of the
Provence-Alpes- Côte d'Azur. It is managed by a metropolitan council of 240
members appointed by the participating communes. It exercises authority over
issues of economic development, land planning and the administration of some
public services. In terms of territorial governance, the metropolis of AixMarseille-Provence is subdivided into six territories – relating back to the old
interfederative entities - each one of them with its own council. There is also
the Council of the Metropolis, with elected President and Vice-President. AixMarseille-Provence benefits from an adapted internal architecture and specific
implementation methods. While the ten French metropolises, created on
January 1, 2015, were the result of the transformation of an urban community
or agglomeration community, without a change in scope, the Aix-MarseilleProvence Metropolis is born from the merger of 6 EPCI (establishment publique
inter-communal) of its territory. Its date of creation was therefore postponed to
January 1, 2016 and a transitional period between 2016 and 2020 was
introduced to accommodate the administrative complexity of this merger.

Figure 1: Aix-Marseille Provence Metropolis

Source: http://www.marseille-provence.fr

The Aix-Marseille-Provence is legally supported by the General Code
of Land Collectivities and, specially, two laws: (i) The MAPAM law, known as
“modernization of the public action and affirmation of the metropolises,”
promulgated on January 27, 2014, and (ii) the NOTRe law (new territorial
organization of the republic) published on August 8, 2015 in the Official
Journal. This law introduces important shifts to the provisions relating to the
organization and functioning of the metropolis initially envisaged by the
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MAPAM law. According to its official electronic page, 18 the law defines certain
powers as falling exclusively within the metropolis´ authority: major master
plans in economic development and organization of economic spaces and
metropolitan operations, territorial coherence, transport and mobility, roads,
housing, urban development, sanitation and rainwater, market of national
interest, waste management, the environment, energy, climate, support
programs and support for higher education institutions and research programs,
concession of the public distribution of electricity and gas, urban heating or
cooling networks and the development of the metropolitan project.
According to research conducted by the Brazilian Metropolitan
Observatory, 19 “the experience of the Marseille-Aix metropolitan area shows
the limits and potentialities of negotiation among local actors in the relatively
centralized French system.” The negotiation challenges are presented by this
research as one of the main institutional challenges to overcome. It should be
noted that this is a territory with a low degree of social capital and with large
intra-metropolitan disparities and that was strongly affected by the process of
productive restructuring. Since the mid-1960s, the restructuring of the
petrochemical, naval and mining industries has strongly affected the city of
Marseille, which has gone into decay. At the same time, in the mildest of the
process of decentralization, which began in the 1980s, French cities and regions
gained a greater degree of autonomy in structuring their policies, but without
mechanisms to ensure a proper degree of cooperation on the metropolitan scale.
Greater collaboration was only perceived in the beginning of the 21st century,
after an affirmative action 20 in direction of bigger powers to metropolitan
structures, with the enactment of the NOTRe law (new territorial organization
of the republic).
According to Mr. Vincent Fouchier, general director adjunct of AixMarseille-Provence Metropolis, who delivered the first lecture in the Study
Space 2017 in Marseille, the fundamental pillar to strengthening the
institutionalization of the Aix-Marseille-Provence metropolis were: (i)
cooperation and (ii) innovation. Cooperation to overcome the inequality of its
communes and the local disputes and to solve common metropolitan issues, as
transportation, housing and quarrels against suburbs and innovation, by new
concepts, as smart cities, living labs, smart transportation and technology
incubators. The work conducted in Aix-Marseille-Provence was to create
institutional tools of partnership and a sense of collectiveness never experienced
18

Available at http://www.marseille-provence.fr/index.php/la-metropole/la-metropole-aixmarseille-provence, with access in 10 December 2017.
19
OBSERVATÓRIO DAS METRÓPOLES. Novas governanças para as áreas
metropolitanas o panorama internacional e as perspectivas para o caso brasileiro. Disposal
in: http://www.observatoriodasmetropoles.ufrj.br/relatorio_Klink.pdf, with access in 23
February 2018.
20
The Law MAPAM is considered the one of the modernisation of public action and
metropolitan affirmative act and was published in 27 January 2014.
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before. There were four pillars over which the cooperative work had to stand:
(i) democracy, once the metropolis are considered to be too far away from the
citizens; (ii) innovation, by technology incubators to create the cities of the
future; (iii) partnership, to share good practices and become known in the
international scene and (iv) internationalization, to become a global metropolis.
The research developed by the Brazilian Metropolitan Observatory21
verified that, after working with the communes together, there was a gradual
strengthening of the community (intermunicipal consortium), mainly due to two
factors. First, there was a greater awareness among the mayors that the decision
to delegate certain services of common interest should take place on a
consensual basis, that is, from the individual analysis of each city/comune about
the relationship cost/benefit rationality of regionalization. 22 A growing number
of cities have urban community due to the impossibility of paying, individually,
the costs of operation and maintenance of services such as public transport and
waste management. Increasing economy of scale is a great asset a regional
development metropolis can offer. A second factor that strengthened the
consortium movement was the selective financial incentives set up by the
central government to stimulate urban communities. 23 This system played an
important role in reducing disputes among participating cities.
The Aix-Marseille-Provence is demonstrating that the legal framework
alone for this innovative structure of government is not sufficient to promote
cooperation on behalf of the common regional good. The institutionalization of
a metropolitan authority with concrete actions to demonstrate to local
authorities and city dwellers the value of collaborative management structures
is akin to achieving the regional urban development goals. Based on the
experience drawn from the Aix-Marseille-Provence metropolitan case study,
the following section will examine the case of the metropolitan region of Rio de
Janeiro.
21

Available at: http://www.observatoriodasmetropoles.ufrj.br/relatorio_Klink.pdf, with access
in 23 February 2018.
22
For a discussion about law and economics, it must be rid of the controversials thoughts of
Posner: POSNER, Richard A. Economic Analysis of Law. Boston: Little Brown, 1973.
Applyng to the relation cost-benefit in decision of Public Administration, the pragmatism of
Posner is used not by judges, but administrators.
23
The opposite happened in Brazil, where the fund created by the Metropolitan Statute was
rejected by the President, what tends to make failure the initiatives in large scale, that demands
a strong budget. The veto over the creation of a national metropolitan fund came to be criticized
as a decisive factor for the possible failure of the FPICs which, given the breadth of the territory
covered, presupposes the need for substantial financial resources. According to Santos and
Vasques, "by rejecting Section II of the Metropolitan Statute, where the National Integrated
Urban Development Fund (FNDUI) was foreseen, the sources of funding for these services did
not receive adequate treatment, unchanged the picture of strong heterogeneity among the
Brazilian municipalities”. (SANTOS, Ângela Moulin Penalva. e VASQUES, Pedro. Estatuto
da Metrópole: avanço normativo na gestão territorial a espera de cooperação financeira. In:
AIETA, Vânia. (Org.) Direito da Cidade. Tomo I. Coleção UERJ 80 Anos. Rio de Janeiro:
Freitas Bastos, 2015)
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4.2.

THE METROPOLITAN REGION OF RIO DE JANEIRO (“RMRJ”)

The Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro was legally instituted in
1975. 24 It is currently formed by municipalities located along and in the
surroundings of the Guanabara Bay. The participating cities are: Belford Roxo,
Duque de Caxias, Nilópolis, Guapimirim, Itaboraí, Niterói, Magé, Maricá, Nova
Iguaçu, Paracambi, Queimados, São Gonçalo, São João do Meriti, Seropédica,
Mesquita, Tanguá, Itaguaí and Japeri. This grouping of neighboring cities
exposes a great deal of intrametropolitan inequality. The city of Rio de Janeiro,
despite also being a very unequal city, presents much higher socioeconomic
indicators than the other participating cities. Japeri, for instance, ranks at the
bottom of the Brazilian equivalent of the Human Development Index (“HDI”),
comparable to those cities of least developed countries in Africa. Considering
that the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro exists since 1975, such great
socioeconomic inequality is strong evidence of the failure of this regional
governance struture in promoting integrated policies towards increasing the
quality of life of its inhabitants. 25

24

During this time, the RMRJ has been (re)created by successive laws, generally maintaining
the same federative entities. The most revolutionary one – written after the decision of the
Supreme Court about one of them and the Metropolitan Statute – is still just a project in the
Legislative Power. That´s the Complementary Law Project n. 10/2015, presented in face of the
Legislative Concil of the State of Rio de Janeiro.
25
“The cause of this intrametropolitan inequality seems to be the absence of what has been
called the centralized and exclusive metropolitan governance structure, capable of articulating
the interests and sharing the metropolitan issues of all the Federative Entities that integrate the
Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (RMRJ), for which, for historical reasons, the capital,
the city of Rio de Janeiro, ended up ´isolated´" CORREIA, Arícia Fernandes. Governança
Metropolitana: desafio para a gestão pública fluminense. XXIII Encontro Nacional do
Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação em Direito 2014. Florianópolis:
CONPEDI, 2014, with disposal in:
<http://publicadireito.com.br/publicacao/ufsc/livro.php?gt=194> and access in 10 january
2015.
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Figure 2: Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro

Source: http://www.mapa-brasil.com
The extinction of the Foundation for Regional Development of Rio de
Janeiro (“FUNDREM”) in 1989, a centralized metropolitan entity in charge of
the planning and execution of regional public policies, left the RMRJ
institutional arrangements pulverized, segmented and "thematic." The RMRJ
became powerless, incapable (in theory) to coordinate the implementation of
public policies of common interest. In this sense, the aforementioned decision
of the Brazilian Supreme Court, according to which the state and municipalities
within a metropolitan region have shared decision-making power, renewed the
hopes of a more effective governance structure. This decision allowed for an
inclusive and balanced decision-making process, guaranteeing a voice for
municipalities and the state without undermining the constitutional legislative
and executive state and municipal federalist authorities.
For many years the state of Rio de Janeiro enjoyed qualified decision
power over water treatment services or whenever a municipality claimed
constitutional authority to exercise such power, it could do so. Even with the
creation of a metropolitan authority, there was no space for integrated and
coordinated decision-making processes. In practice, the constitutional
provisions on shared legislative and executive powers undermined the
metropolitan legal framework calling for regional integration on matters of
common interest. The aforementioned Supreme Court case shifted this scenario.
The Court ruled unconstitutional the Rio de Janeiro state law (re)recreating the
RMRJ in the part that conferred upon the state qualified decision-making power
over water treatment facilities. The ruling considered that the state law invaded
the city of Rio de Janeiro’s federative autonomy. Furthermore, the opinion
highlighted that municipalities were not entitled to claim their constitutional
autonomy to decide alone without due care to the stakes of other metropolitan
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cities and the state itself on those issues of common interest like water treatment
services, the subject of the lawsuit before the Supreme Court. 26
After the Supreme Court decision on the matter, Congress enacted the
Metropolitan Region Act (Law 13,089/2015). This statute instituted governance
standards and criteria for the sharing of decision-making power among
municipalities and the state. It also created the institutional framework and
imposed obligations upon participating municipalities and the state to
collaborate on matters of common interest. The statute called for ample public
participation in the deliberation process and imposed the obligation for an
integrated Regional Urban Plan. This is a powerful legal tool as it has the
potential to impose a collaborative attitude upon the local policymaker.
Currently, the State of Rio de Janeiro’s legislature is examined a
restructuring bill that would adapt the RMRJ to the provisions set forth in the
federal framework law. However, a major source of controversy in this bill lies
on the heavy weight of the state and city of Rio de Janeiro in the decisionmaking process. By insisting on an unbalanced system of consideration over
matters of regional common interest, the bill is prone to failure once again. It is
crucial that local policymakers and the legislature understand the need to set
aside the limitations imposed by the pseudo constitutional autonomy in matters
of regional common interest to fight the great socioeconomic inequalities the
RMRJ is struggling to solve since it was first instituted in 1975.
5.

CONCLUSION

With the demographic explosion of the last century and the conurbation
phenomenon experience by major cities, a demand for a new form of
governance structure arose. A governance structure that takes into account
matters traditionally considered issues of strictly local interest, such as
transportation, waste management, water supply and treatment and affordable
housing became concerns of common regional interest. The demand for this
new form of interfederative governance system became part of national
agendas, irrespective of how each nation’s system of government is structured.
The cases of France and Brazil highlighted in this comparative manuscript are
illustrative of such a phenomenon.
The 2013 French Metropolis law reflected an ongoing practice initiated
by the need for more coordinated regional policy strategies with the
constitutional decentralization movement of the 20th Century. Informal
collaborative initiatives within the territorial collectivities uniting different
communes became formally integrated into Metropolis with the new legal
paradigm. The French Metropolis of Aix-an-Marseille-Provence constitutes a
26

Adin n. 1842/RJ - STF
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rich case study of how the new legal framework allowed for the region to
overcome great challenges relating to inequalities and economic depression.
Conversely, Brazil has a legal framework allowing for more formal
structures of metropolitan regions dating back to the constitutional regime of
1967. However, due to the challenges of a constitutional framework allowing
for a great degree of legislative and executive autonomy to states and
municipalities, together with a high degree of socioeconomic inequality among
cities facing conurbation, tackling those obstacles has been politically difficult.
A Supreme Court ruling setting the grounds for a balanced collaborative
decision-making metropolitan governance structure along with the 2015 new
Metropolitan Region Act constitute promising legal changes in overcoming the
historical barriers before a successful regional integration model.
What the lessons from the weeklong immersion in the Aix-an-MarseilleProvence Metropolis demonstrated, especially in comparison with the
Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro, is that the local entities’ approach to
urban issues is no longer effective. A new urban management framework is
necessary irrespective of how each nation’s system of government is structured.
It arises from the demands created by the conurbation phenomenon, attracting
more than half of the world’s population to major cities and their suburban
municipalities. Issues that, in the recent past, have been considered strictly of
local interest have now become challenges of common regional concern.
Recognizing this demographic phenomenon and, consequently, new urban
territorial shift is crucial for an effective law and regulatory policy design that
creates the proper incentives for collaborative and integrated actions within
metropolitan areas.
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